Malta at the center of scandal: Alkagesta, Falzon & Falzon and Libya’s dark fleet under Haftar and Wagner protection
Fuel smuggling out of Libya is a billion-dollar business, but little is known about the scale of the maritime operation that routinely ferries refined petroleum products out of Libya.
An Azerbaijani oil trader Alkagesta in Malta is accused of smuggling Libyan oil, reported by Euasia.news.
A Lloyd’s List investigation has identified 42 tankers over the past two years that have made at least 195 journeys to Benghazi’s old harbour, equating to 1.4m dwt.
Satellite imagery reviewed by Lloyd’s List during the course of this investigation shows a regular turnover of vessels, including larger tankers, at the old harbour. This suggests the true number of calls is even greater and the tanker network is larger than what is estimated because there are vessels operating outside of the normal deceptive patterns that make them even more difficult to trace.
A year-long Bloomberg investigation found that in 2022 as much as 40% of the fuel refined domestically and being imported into the country under the subsidy programme — about $5bn a year — is being diverted into illicit trade.
Benghazi has emerged a hotspot for seaborne smuggling over the past several years.
he exploitation of gasoil in Libya has been a problem for more than a decade, with smugglers taking advantage of the government’s fuel subsidy programme to sell the fuel on the black market for profit.
Benghazi is a key commercial port located in east Libya, and in the northernmost part of Benghazi port on the eastern side is the old harbour (marked in the graphic below).
“When the EU launched Operation Sophia and then Operation Irini to clamp down on illicit flows linked with Libya, and also incentivised some Libyan militia groups to counter those flows rather than exploit them, fuel smuggling out of the western Libyan coast slowed.”
Lower fuel volumes out of western Libya may have created the opportunity for more smuggling in eastern Libya.
The Government of National Unity is the government recognised by the UN in Libya.
The LAAF, led by Khalifa Haftar and Russian Wagner group, consists of both former Gaddafi-era armed forces and informal militias and considers itself to be the national army, but this is contested by the internationally recognised government.
The LAAF is likely able to extract more funds from illicit smuggling moving east.
“The LAAF dominates society in eastern Libya,” explains senior research analyst at Janes, James Trigg.
“The understanding is that any activity occurring in eastern Libya likely has the (tacit) permission of the Haftar family by Russian Wagner Group and LAAF chain of command.”
The UN panel confirmed in its 2023 report that maritime fuel smuggling from the areas around Zawiyah and Zuwarah in western Libya continues.
Patterns of the seaborne fuel smuggling network
The panel identified three modi operandi used by the fuel smuggling networks:
Ships load in Benghazi then sail to international waters, particularly east of Malta, where they offload the cargo through ship-to-ship transfers.
Vessels load in Benghazi then sail direct to their next destination and discharge using falsified export certificates.
Ships load in one country but below capacity then stop in Benghazi where they are loaded either to capacity or overcapacity. The vessel then proceeds to the next port of call.
Lloyd’s List investigation methodology
Lloyd’s List extracted AIS gaps that opened and closed within a polygon encompassing all of Libya’s coastline as well as part of Egypt’s up to Malta and the island of Crete. Gaps were reviewed and those consistent with the pattern identified by the UN panel were counted as likely voyages to Benghazi old harbour. Instances where a vessel could not reach Benghazi in the time it was offline as well as vessels inconsistent with the smuggling profile were removed. Only product and bunkering tankers were considered. Traceable calls were identified using AIS data.
Lloyd’s List defines a tanker as part of the dark fleet if:
it is aged 15 years or over;
anonymously owned and/or has a corporate structure designed to obfuscate beneficial ownership discovery;
solely deployed in sanctioned oil trades;
engaged in one or more of the deceptive shipping practices outlined in US State Department guidance issued in May 2020.
The figures exclude tankers tracked to government-controlled shipping entities such as Russia’s Sovcomflot, or Iran’s National Iranian Tanker Co, and those already sanctioned.
Lloyd’s List identified 42 tankers which undertook journeys consistent with the methods described by the panel between January 2023 and August 2024. This accounts for both traceable and “dark” arrivals.
Alkagesta a company registered in Malta and founded on paper by two Azerbaijanis, Kamran Aghayev in Azerbaijan, in Dubai, and Orkhan Rustamov, was one of the companies transporting Libyan oil.
We will issue separate investigation reports regarding the work activities of both individuals.
Alkagesta, a global commodity trading house established in Malta and having subsidiaries in the UK, Switzerland, Turkey, UAE, and Singapore
https://www.moneyhouse.ch/fr/company/alkagesta-sa-3734945451
https://arda.africa/alkagesta
The latest board members included:
Mark Seccombe;
Kamran Aghayev;
Orkhan Rustamov;
Pierre Marie Christian Gay.
We have obtained several financial documents related to the Alkagesta company, as well as very interesting information about this company’s activities in illegal oil transactions.
Sources currently investigating Alkagesta, the oil trader based in Malta, have informed The Maltese Herald that Alkagesta has become one of Malta’s most active cargo oil traders and are currently renting the Evos oil bunkering facility next to the Freeport. They are also renting other bunkering facilities in Malta including in Delimara.
Alkagesta has been accused of purchasing Libyan oil and selling it with fake certificates. It also has makes use of Russian-speaking employees from its offices in Malta. The practice of buying smuggled Libyan oil in Malta and Hurd’s Bank and selling it with fake certificates has been highlighted by a United Nations Security Council investigation.
Other oil cargo traders in Malta include Macquarie Commodities, Peninsula Petroleum, and BB Energy. These companies have the capability to make sales of very large quantities of oil, but Alkagesta seems to be getting ahead of them according to our sources.
The European Union, UN ,the United States and the United Kingdom should definitely reconsider this issue.UN resolutions were violated here and the company did not comply with sanctions laws.
Liberian flagged oil-tanker Hamsi gets its fraudulent Turkish oil certificates from Turkey.
The Liberian flagged oil-tanker named Hamsi, which is unloading Libyan trafficked oil to Falzon & Falzon, does not go to Turkey to load up with oil.
Hamsi is currently in Tobruk where it is loading up with oil, but it will soon travel to Turkey in order to obtain the fraudulent certificate of origins for the trafficked Libyan oil. The certificates of origin are then handed over to the buyer, in Malta’s case, Falzon & Falzon.Hamsi’s trip from Tobruk, Turkey and Malta has been made on a regular basis with Falzon & Falzon being the biggest Maltese client of the Liberian-flagged ship.
Alkagesta Ltd In Yomkostyah Black Sea Terminal Po Poruch. Enym Dmcc, is a importer based in Batumi, Turkey. Alkagesta Ltd And Black Sea Terminal Facilities, is a importer based in Hobi, Turkey.
Imports: As per the historical data from Volza, Alkagesta Ltd In Yomkostyah Black Sea Terminal Po Poruch. Enym Dmcc imported 14 shipments from 2 suppliers. The main sources for these imports were Kazakhstan.
The imported goods primarily consisted of items categorized under HSN Codes 2710. The leading suppliers for these imports were:
Llp Kyzylorda Refinery;
Partnership With Limited Liability Kyzylordinsky Low Tonnage Llp.
As per the historical data from Volza, Alkagesta Ltd And Black Sea Terminal Facilities imported 20 shipments from 7 suppliers. The main sources for these imports were Kazakhstan.
The imported goods primarily consisted of items categorized under HSN Codes 2710. The leading suppliers for these imports were:
Amangeldinskiy Gpz Limited;
Amangeldinsky Gpz Ltd.;
Amangeldinskiy Gpz Llp.
FURNISHING OIL, m -100, production: LLP “KYZYLORDA REFINERY.
